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Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), being capable of beating PNS attack and uncon-
ditionally secure, have become an attractive one recently. But, in many QKD systems, disturbances
of transmission channel make quantum bit error rate (QBER) increase which limits both security
distance and key bit rate of real-life decoy state QKD systems. We demonstrate the two-intensity
decoy QKD with one-way Faraday-Michelson phase modulation system, which is free of channel dis-
turbance and keeps interference fringe visibility (99%) long period, near 130KM single mode optical
fiber in telecom (1550 nm) wavelength. This is longest distance fiber decoy state QKD system based
on two intensity protocol.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3], as a com-
bination of quantum mechanics and cryptography, can
help two distant peers (Alice and Bob) share string of
bits, called key. With key and one time pad method,
absolutely secure communication become possible. How-
ever, most of QKD protocols, such as BB84, needs single
photon source, which is not practical for present technol-
ogy. Usually, real-file QKD set-ups [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] use
attenuated laser pulses (weak coherent states) instead.
It means the density matrix of states of photons emit-
ted from Alice is: ρ =
∑
∞
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n|. Therefore, a few
multi-photons pulses in the laser pulses emitted from Al-
ice opens the door of Photon-Number-Splitting attack
(PNS attack) [11, 12, 13]. Fortunately, decoy state QKD
theory [14, 15, 16, 17], as a good solution to beat PNS
attack, has been proposed. The essential idea of decoy
state QKD is randomly changing the intensity (average
photon number) of the laser pulses from Alice, then Bob
can get different counting rates of laser pulses of different
intensities. From this, Alice and Bob can calculate the
lower bound of counting rate of single photon pulses (SL1 )
and upper bound of quantum bit error rate (QBER) of
bits generated by single photon pulses (eU1 ). At last, with
error correction and privacy amplification, uncondition-
ally secure key could be get.
Now, among protocols of decoy state QKD, two-
intensity protocol [17] and three-intensity protocol [16]
are ready for experiment. The former just uses two
states: coherent states with average photon number µ,
called signal state, and ν, called decoy state, satisfying
µ > ν. SL1 and e
U
1 for two-intensity protocol are given by
[17]:
S1 ≥ SL1 =
µ
µν − ν2 (S
L
ν e
ν − Sµeµ ν
2
µ2
− EµSµeµµ
2 − ν2
1
2
µ2
)
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EµSµ
SL
1
µe−µ
,
(1)
where,
SLν = Sν(1−
uα√
NνSν
), (2)
Here Nν is the number of pulses used as decoy states, Eµ
is quantum bit error rate of µ laser pulses, Sµ is counting
rate of signal pulses, and Sν is counting rate of decoy
pules. Therefore the lower bound of key generation rate
(RL) is:
R ≥ RL = q{−Sµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) + SL1 µe−µ[1−H2(eU1 )]}
(3)
where, f(Eµ) represents bidirectional error correction ef-
ficiency and q depends on implementation (1/2 for BB84
protocol).
Recently, two-intensity protocol and three-intensity
protocols have been implemented in several experiments
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In [18, 23] two-intensity de-
coy QKD protocol was successfully performed, though
Plug&Play system is not unconditionally secure. In
[19], a long distance (102KM) three-intensity decoy
state QKD experiment based on polarization modula-
tion was demonstrated. In [20], researchers finished a
very long distance (107KM) three-intensity decoy QKD,
but their experiment used ultra-low-noise, high efficiency
transition-edge sensor photo-detectors, which may be not
very practical to most commercial QKD systems.
To prolong security distance of ordinary QKD or de-
coy state QKD, depressing QBER is necessary. To keep
stability of interference fringe visibility is essential for
depressing QBER, especially for long distance case. In
fact, polarization disturbances introduced by quantum
channel and optical devices is primary cause to decrease
interference fringe visibility and increase probability that
a photon hit the erroneous detector, which makes QBER
rise. One way Faraday-Michelson QKD system [8, 9]
can be free of the disturbance of transmission fiber, to
keep stability of interference fringe visibility. Here, in
our experiment, we have implemented two-intensity de-
coy QKD experiment over 120KM single mode fibers, just
2One SPD scheme [10] differs from traditional phase-
modulation type QKD system. In the latter, Bob ran-
domly chooses between his phase shifts 0 or pi/2, then
Bob must use two SPDs to record his photon counts.
The two different phase shifts represent the two conju-
gate bases of BB84 respectively, and one detector records
bit 0, the other records bit 0. However, in single SPD
scheme, both Alice and Bob choose between phase shifts
0, pi/2, pi and 3pi/2. Alice and Bob just take phase shifts
0 and pi/2 as bit 0 and others as bit 1. In fact, the only
difference is that in one SPD scheme Bob only detects
phase difference of 0 or pi, while in two SPDs scheme
Bob detects phase difference of 0 and pi. Though the
counting rate of one SPD scheme is half of that of two
SPDs scheme, one SPD scheme may have security advan-
tages over two SPDs scheme. Vadim Makarov et al have
proposed an attack to two SPDs scheme, utilizing the
detectors efficiency mismatch (see [24] for details). One
SPD scheme is immune to this attack. The use of optical
circulators both in Alice and Bob makes our system also
immune to large pulse attack[25, 26].
II. EXPERIMENT SET-UP
Our experiment set-up consists of control system, op-
tical system, synchronization light detector (SLD) and
avalanche photon diode SPD (just one SPD with dark
counting rate 5 × 10−7). Based on Faraday-Michelson
phase modulation [8], the interference visibility keeps
high and consistent. Repetition frequency of our system
is 1MHz. The flow for an operation which means the pro-
cess of a laser pulse (decoy or signal) emitted form Alice
and detected by Bob is below:
Alice randomly triggers the decoy or signal laser diode
(DFB laser diodes) to emit decoy laser pulse or signal
laser pulse (quantum light for abbreviation) and drives
synchronization laser diode to emit synchronization laser
pulse at the same time. After emitted from Alice, quan-
tum light enters Alice’s Faraday-Michelson interferom-
eter, attenuated by electrical variable optical attenua-
tor (EVOA) to proper intensity (average photon number
per pulse: 0.6 for signal pulses, and 0.2 for decoy signal
pulses), enters 123KM single mode fiber (quantum chan-
nel), phase-modulated by Bob’s Faraday-Michelson inter-
ferometer and is detected by Bob’s SPD at last. Synchro-
nization laser pulse goes through another single mode
fiber (synchronization channel) which is almost as long
as quantum channel. After emitted from Alice, synchro-
nization laser pulse enters synchronization fiber immedi-
ately, in a while is detected by SLD, and then SLD gives
a signal to notify control board of Bob. Then Bob’s con-
trol board makes his phase modulator get ready for this
operation, and after a subtle delay, control board of Bob
generates a trigger signal to SPD, which detect the quan-
tum light pulse and tell the result to control board. After
all operations finished, Alice announces decoy and signal
information and phase modulation information through
classical communication. According to this information,
Bob calculates Sµ, Sν and then S
L
1 , E
U
1 through equa-
tion (1) and (2). Now we can perform error correction
and privacy amplification to get unconditionally secure
key. The structure of our two-intensity decoy QKD sys-
tem is demonstrated on figure 1.
FIG. 1: m Att: manual attenuator which modulates the in-
tensity ratio of signal laser pulse and decoy laser pulse; FM:
Faraday mirror; PM: phase modulator; E ATT: EVOA; SLD:
synchronization laser detector; SPD: single photon detector;
CIR1: Alice ’s optical circulator which only allow light leave
Alice’s security zone , never allow light enter Alice’s security
zone; CIR2: Bob ’s optical circulator which only allow light
enter Bob’s security zone, never allow light leave Bob’s se-
curity zone; the two circulators make our system immune to
large pulse attack;
Intensity Modulation: How to realize laser pulse in-
tensity modulation is first step to perform decoy state
QKD. Through making simple modifications to the ordi-
nary QKD system to realize intensity modulation is very
important to widen the use of decoy state QKD. In our
experiment, we use two laser diodes method to realize
laser pulse intensity modulation. We add a manual op-
tical attenuator to one of laser diode output. Then a
fiber optical beam splitter is used to couple the two laser
output. We carefully adjust the manual optical attenua-
tor to make sure ratio of the two laser pulse intensity is
1:3. Now, we can modulate intensity through selecting
different laser diode. With changing voltage on EVOA,
we can also modulate the intensity of laser pulse, but
the repetition frequency of EVOA is too low. Two laser
diodes method is very convenient and able to work with
high repetition frequency.
Synchronization: Synchronization, especially to find
the precision delay between synchronization laser pulse
and quantum light pulse is very important to lower the
QBER. The timing jitter of our SLD is less than 500ps,
while the gate-width of SPD is 2.5ns. So the QBER
caused by timing jitter is deeply depressed.
Phase Modulation: How to precisely determine the
phase modulation voltage is essential for lowering QBER.
Because of environmental disturbance, the phase modu-
lation voltage may drift randomly. To avoid the influence
of this drift, we use active phase compensation scheme.
According to the half-wave voltage of Alice’s phase mod-
3ulator, Alice can set her phase modulation voltage (for
0, pi/2, pi and 3pi/2) definitely. Before transferring laser
pulses for generating key, Alice sets an arbitrary phase
modulation voltage, and then emits strong laser pulses to
the quantum channel, then Bob scans the whole possible
phase modulation voltage and watches the counting rates
from SPD. According to results of this scan, Bob can de-
termine his phase modulation voltage (for 0, pi/2, pi and
3pi/2). The time spent to determine phase modulation
working points relies on the drift speed of interferometers.
In common, the ratio between time spent to determine
phase modulation working points and the total working
time is below 5%.
III. RESULTS&CONCLUSION
Experiment Results: We set f(Eµ) = 1.2, average pho-
ton number µ = 0.6 for signal laser pulses and ν = 0.2 for
decoy laser pulses. The ratio of decoy laser pulse num-
ber and signal laser pulse number is 1:1, and 2G laser
pulses was emitted in total. Table I is the results for the
experiment. With the experiment results, equation (1),
(2) and (3), we can get SL1 , e
U
1 , and Rµ. In table II, the
length verse SL1 , e
U
1 , and Rµ are given. In Figure 2, a
graph on the length verse Rµ are given too.
Length (KM) Sµ Eµ Sν Eν
123.6 3.8× 10−5 0.0199 1.36 × 10−5 0.041
108 7.1× 10−5 0.016 2.52 × 10−5 0.027
97 1.24 × 10−4 0.015 4.3× 10−5 0.017
83.7 1.57 × 10−4 0.0145 5.28 × 10−5 0.019
62.1 2.88 × 10−4 0.0108 1.08 × 10−4 0.0225
49.2 8.6× 10−4 0.0103 2.9× 10−4 0.020
TABLE I: The length of fiber, counting rates of µ laser pulse
Sµ, QBER of key generated from µ laser pulse Eµ, counting
rates of ν laser pulse Sν and QBER of key generated from
µ laser pulse Eν . This values are all measured directly from
experiment.
With the experiment results, equation (2) and (3), we
can get SL1 , e
U
1 , and Rµ. In table II, the length verse S
L
1 ,
eU1 , and Rµ are given. In Figure 2, a graph on the length
verse Rµ are given too.
Form Figure 2, we find the limited fiber distance
is about 130KM. We have successfully realized up to
130KM decoy states QKD protocol just with simple two-
intensity protocol on one-way Faraday-Michelson phase
modulation system. And really unconditionally secure
key can be distributed through such a long distance fiber.
In conclusion, we have implemented two-intensity de-
coy QKD protocol on the one-way Faraday-Michelson
phase modulation QKD system with a popular avalanche
photon diode detector. Unlike many other QKD systems
which is suffered of disturbances of transmission channel,
one way Faraday-Michelson QKD system, which is free
of polarization disturbances caused by quantum channel
Length (KM) SL1 e
U
1 Rµ
123.6 3.78× 10−5 0.0607 9.59 × 10−7
108 8.09× 10−5 0.0426 4.89 × 10−6
97 1.41× 10−4 0.0399 9.29 × 10−6
83.7 1.69× 10−5 0.0409 1.07 × 10−5
62.1 4.46× 10−4 0.0211 4.77 × 10−5
49.2 1.09× 10−3 0.0247 1.06 × 10−4
TABLE II: The length of fiber, counting rate of single photon
laser pulse SL1 , QBER of key generated from single laser pho-
ton pulse eU1 , rate of generating secure key Rµ. This values
are all calculated through equation (2)and (3) with parame-
ters from Table I.
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FIG. 2: Lower bound of rate of secure key RLµ verse fiber
length L. Each point is get directly from experiment.
and optical devices in the system, can really keep steady
and high interference fringe visibility, and leads to low
QBER. With low and steady QBER, both security dis-
tance and key bit rate of decoy state QKD are improved.
It’s noticeable that one way Faraday-Michelson QKD sys-
tem free of channel disturbances can be used directly
in commercial condition not only in lab. Our system
can provide unconditionally secure key distribution ser-
vice up to 130KM optical fiber on telecom wavelength
(1550nm). So far, this distance is longest in real-life two-
intensity decoy state QKD systems.
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